Somalis are quick to expect the international community to solve their problems. Yet, the international community, including the United States, has contributed to the dismal situation in Somalia through inattention, misunderstanding, and unwise policy decisions dating back to the departure of United Nations’ forces in 1995. Ultimately, only Somalis can end the crisis; the international community will only have an impact on the margins. outside world should continue to support the Djibouti peace process so long as it has any life and put pressure on Somali groups to accept the process. The departure of Ethiopian troops from Somalia at the end of 2008 is both perilous and offers an opportunity. While an extremist Islamist group may seize the capital city on this occasion, the Ethiopian withdrawal also removes the strongest argument for current support of Islamists. In the meantime, the world has focused on Somali piracy, which is a manifestation of the absence of a national government in Somalia, and will not end until there is an effective government in the country.

American and International Mistakes

Since 1995, the most egregious mistakes made by the international community included the abandonment of Somalia, with the notable exception of providing significant amounts of humanitarian aid. Washington took a brief interest in Somalia’s political situation only when it appeared to be a potential refuge for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan late in 2001. The United States again focused on Somalia early in 2006 when the Islamic Courts, a union of sharia courts, began to take power from warlords in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. Failing to understand the political dynamics in Somalia, Washington supported discredited Somali warlords who quickly lost control to the Islamic Courts’ militia. As the Islamic Courts consolidated power in Somalia, Washington gave a green light late in 2006 to Ethiopia, which has a 1,000-mile long border with Somalia but is a traditional enemy, to support Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) efforts to defeat the Islamic Courts. Although Ethiopian troops and the weak TFG quickly achieved this goal, Ethiopia has been bogged down in Somalia ever since and has increasingly drawn the ire of most Somalis. The Ethiopian military presence has served as a rallying point for Somali opposition elements.

In spite of these mistakes by both the United States and the international community, most of the problems in Somalia are of the Somalis’ own making. Only they are in a position to achieve a lasting solution. The United States and others can offer help by applying pressure on key parties in the political process and supporting Somali civil society organizations with solid track records of success. These Somali organizations are the long-term hope for the country, but they unfortunately do not have the ability to counter armed militias. The international community, which provides assistance to the approximately 40 percent of Somalis who are dependent on external aid, should continue to alleviate the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Finally, it can finance economic redevelopment once a Somali-driven political process achieves real progress.

Failed Solution

The African Union has 3,400 troops, well under the stated goal of 8,000, from Uganda and Burundi to help keep the peace in Mogadishu. Yet, even if this force were at full strength, it is unrealistic to expect it to counter committed Somali adversaries or to separate Somali factions fighting in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia. The African Union has inadequate funding, insufficient logistical capacity, and the wrong mix of heavy equipment to deal with urban guerrilla warfare. A much larger African Union force might be capable of “keeping” the peace–if there were a peace to keep. Rather, the real task is to “make” peace. This would require that all the major Somali factions, at a minimum, to tolerate the African Union force. Only a huge United Nations peacekeeping operation—one that contains no troops from Somalia’s immediate neighbors—has any chance of “making” peace in a hostile Somali environment. However, the success of even such an extensive operation is questionable. In any event, the UN is not inclined to authorize such a force, and, even if authorized, several months would pass before the first troops arrived in Somalia.

Moving Forward

The only lasting solution for the country is a Somali political process that agrees on broad parameters for a settlement. The process known as the Djibouti Agreement, led by the United Nations’ Secretary General’s Special Representative, still offers that possibility, but time is fast running out. This process resulted from an agreement between an ostensibly moderate Islamist group and the TFG on basic issues, including an acknowledgement of the need for Ethiopian forces to exit Somalia and the inclusion of Islamist parliamentary representatives by doubling the Somali Parliament. Ethiopia has reduced its forces in Somalia and says it will be out by the end of 2008 or early 2009. The African Union force will probably leave at the same time, although there is conflicting information on this point. The United States supports the Djibouti Agreement and should continue this support so long as it holds any hope of success.

Unfortunately, a hard-line faction of the Islamic Courts rejected the Djibouti Agreement. The United States has designated al-Shabaab, a militia that once fought for the Islamic Courts but now is independent and divided with ties to regions and clans, as a terrorist organization. These hard-line groups, together with freelancing warlords, pose the greatest obstacle to the success of the Djibouti Agreement. By its own admission, al-Shabaab has links to al-Qaeda, although these ties may not be as significant as even al-Shabaab suggests. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab has imported foreign jihadists and Somali jihadists from the diaspora, raising an important question: should those participating in the Djibouti Agreement process negotiate with al-Shabaab and the Islamic hardliners, who will be in the strongest position to seize Mogadishu when the Ethiopian forces leave? Somalis must make this decision.

Somalia is a highly oral society where Somali leaders eventually all speak to each other. Whereas Westerners are reluctant to communicate with extremists and, especially, persons linked to international terrorism, this will not deter Somalis from such communication. It would be pointless for the international community to try to prevent a moderate Somali group from talking with an extremist group such as al-Shabaab. In addition, Somalis engage in constant switching of allegiances. Today’s enemy might very well be tomorrow’s ally. The international community needs to accept these cultural characteristics as an important part of Somali society.

The departure of the Ethiopians, which has been a popular rallying cry for al-Shabaab, may offer a silver lining to Somali moderates by eliminating the principal reason behind the high degree of support for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab, which is well financed and relies on disenchanted youth, might lose its legitimacy and much of its grass roots support. The critical period will occur in the days immediately after the Ethiopian departure while al-Shabaab still has credibility. But even if al-Shabaab successfully seizes Mogadishu, its zealotry could result in the same kinds of mistakes that led to the Islamists’ undoing at the beginning of 2007.

The TFG, which is on the verge of collapse, exists at the mercy of Ethiopian troops inside Somalia and due to recognition and support from the international community. In mid-December 2008, the President fired the Prime Minister and named a new one. The previous Prime Minister declared this action illegal and obtained the support of parliament to remain in power. This situation has created even more uncertainty for the TFG and is sapping what little authority the government still retains. All of this suggests a murky outcome, but Somalia has experienced many setbacks since the state failure in 1991. If necessary, it could survive another round of fighting in Mogadishu and position itself for yet another political solution. Ultimately, the United States and the international community can only influence events on the margins.

And Then There Is Piracy

Attacks by Somali pirates dominate the international coverage of Somalia. This is unfortunate. Somali piracy is just a troubling result of a failed state that has had no effective central government for the past seventeen years. It will continue so long as no Somali government controls the country. Since no one is accountable in Somalia, local warlords, al-Shabaab, Islamists, and even some persons affiliated with the TFG probably receive a cut from ransom payments. The only other solutions–a massive international naval presence or hired armed guards for every ship passing through the region—are unlikely. Following pirate attacks on six Chinese flag vessels, even China has announced that it will send two destroyers and a depot ship to the area after Christmas. This will be the first occasion that Chinese naval vessels have engaged in “battle” activity so far from China’s coast. The arrival of the Chinese ships will not notably lessen the challenge. The highest priority is solving the political problem on the land, not piracy on the high seas.

An important, related issue has been the long-standing violation of Somali waters by fishing vessels from Western and Asian nations. There are allegations that ships from these nations have been dumping toxic waste along Somali shores. It is as incumbent upon the international community to help end these practices as it is to end Somali piracy.

Until Somalia is able to reestablish a national government that controls its territory, several steps might reduce the level of piracy in offshore waters. Drawing on satellite imagery, it should be possible to identify at least a few of the “mother ships” used to support the pirates. It is important to make these data available to naval vessels in the region and give them authorization to capture or even sink the mother ships. There are serious legal issues concerning the handling of captured pirates and the sinking of possibly stolen ships. But a drastic situation calls for a drastic response.

Additionally, American merchant ships in these waters chartered to transport U.S. Navy material contain an armed protection team. If small crafts approach the merchant ship in open seas at high speed, these teams fire flares to ward off any attack. So far, this has worked for US Navy-protected merchant ships, but the pirates have simply moved on to an unarmed vessel. Perhaps the time has come to authorize these teams to use live ammunition. Once the word gets out that these teams on merchant ships are sinking small pirate skiffs, the pirates might reassess the profit and loss equation of their business.

In mid-December, the UN Security Council, at the urging of the United States, unanimously passed a Somali anti-piracy resolution that gives member nations the right to “take all necessary measures in Somalia” to interdict pirates. This effectively permits action against pirates on Somali soil. Although much has been made in the media of this resolution, it changes little. Intelligence available to the international community on the situation along the Somali coast is usually inadequate to carry out a successful interdiction without considerable collateral damage. If hostages are involved, the interdiction effort might endanger their lives. The resolution offers a useful tool for the international community on those rare occasions when it might be appropriate to engage in hot pursuit. It will not, however, fundamentally reduce the problem of piracy off Somalia.

Conclusion

The primary effort of the international community in the coming weeks should be continued pressure on all Somali factions to accept the Djibouti process and encourage the development of broad-based governmental institutions that offer hope to most Somalis. The announced departure of Ethiopian troops from Somalia should continue as planned, although this will leave a security vacuum and raise the prospect in the short-term for new conflict. It will then be up to moderate Islamists to prove that they can assert enough control over Mogadishu to prevent a security breakdown. Extreme Islamists could take over the city, although they would probably overplay their hand and eventually fail again. As for piracy, tougher responses from the international community are in order but the emphasis must be on resolving the problem on land. The international community should not continue to ignore illegal fishing in Somali waters by Western and Asian countries and toxic waste dumping along the Somali coast

David Shinn is an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, where he has taught since 2001. He served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service, including assignments as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. His primary areas of research are the Horn of Africa and China-Africa relations.